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I explore whether managers of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) funds
differ in their disclosure behavior as compared with conventional fund managers. Prior
studies suggest that investors of ESG funds have long-term investment horizons, thereby
encouraging fund managers to be less concerned about their quarterly portfolio disclo-
sure. Using a database of third-party sustainability score of mutual funds, I find that
funds that rank high on the score carry out less portfolio window dressing. Further, I
provide evidence that ESG fund managers use long-term performance metrics in their
investment decisions, aligned with their clients’ long-term investment horizons. More-
over, I find that the heterogeneity in disclosure behavior is not due to the endogenous
allocation of fund managers to ESG funds.
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CHAPTER 1
ESG INVESTING AND MUTUAL FUND MANAGER BEHAVIOR
1.1 Introduction
The advent of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investing1 is arguably one
of the most significant innovations in the asset management industry in recent years. In
2017, funds employing variants of ESG criteria comprised approximately $95 billion
of assets under management – representing an astonishing increase of nearly 60% from
the previous year (see Figure 1.1). BlackRock, the world’s largest investment manage-
ment company, recently announced that the company will from now on require its fund
managers to consider ESG criteria in their investment decision-making process2. The
surge in popularity of ESG Investing – once considered a niche investment philosophy
– is increasingly drawing the attention of practitioners and scholars, fostering an im-
portant debate on whether socially responsible investment vehicles can competitively
yield financial returns to their investors in the face of additional constraints in portfo-
lio holdings and investment strategies vis-a`-vis conventional (non-ESG) funds (e.g., see
El Ghoul and Karoui, 2017, Fabozzi et al., 2008, Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009).
Despite the increasing relevance of ESG3 in the mutual fund industry, our under-
standing of the specific mechanisms that separate ESG fund managers from their con-
1What constitutes an acceptable set of ESG criteria is subjective and each fund applies its own set
of ESG criteria. Environmental criteria examine how firms deal with their negative environmental exter-
nalities, such as energy use, waste, pollution, and natural resource conservation. Social criteria examine
the firms’ relationship with their stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, customers, and local com-
munities. The governance criteria examine the firms’ internal controls, executive pay, shareholder rights,
etc.
2For more details, see http://lipperalpha.financial.thomsonreuters.com/2018/08/monday-morning-
memo-has-esg-gone-mainstream/
3The terms ESG funds, Socially Responsible funds, and Sustainable funds are often used interchange-
ably.
1
ventional counterparts is limited. For instance, although we know about the impact
that the behavior of mutual fund managers has on the performance of funds (Agarwal
et al., 2014, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997, 1999a, Cremers and Pareek, 2016), we do not
know if the investment decisions of managers of ESG funds differ from the decisions
of managers of conventional funds regarding portfolio disclosure, investment choices,
and investment horizon. Theoretical work in the area shows that investors may be will-
ing to pay a premium to have socially responsible investments and should invest with a
long-term perspective (Gollier and Pouget, 2014, Heinkel et al., 2001). Consistent with
the hypothesis of longer investment horizons, empirical studies demonstrate that capital
flows of socially responsible funds are less sensitive to past negative returns (Bollen,
2007, Renneboog et al., 2011). However, can the investment philosophy of investors’
clientele determine the behavior of fund managers? Even assuming that the tempo-
ral preferences of investors would create implicit incentives for managers to have longer
investment horizons, incentive alignment cannot be assumed, as managers of ESG funds
have a compensation structure based on their quarterly or annual financial performance
similar to that of conventional fund managers.
In this paper, I explore how the investment horizon of investors of ESG funds trans-
lates to the behavior of the managers of such funds. Specifically, I analyze the disclosure
activities of portfolio managers of ESG mutual funds. Open-end mutual funds are re-
quired, under SEC regulation, to report a complete list of their holdings on a quarterly
basis. I am interested in investigating the opportunistic practices that derive from the
excessive focus on short-term developments (short-termism). My focus on managers’
behavior is motivated by prior work that suggests that implicit incentives generated by
career concerns affect managers’ behavior and, as a consequence, funds’ performance
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1999a) and by studies that suggest that the short-termism of
institutional investors encourages myopic corporate behavior by putting pressure on
2
Figure 1.1 ESG Funds Flows and Assets Under Management (AUM)
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managers of investee firms to place excessive focus on short-term projects (Agarwal
et al., 2017, Bushee, 1998). The underlying premise is that investors of ESG funds, by
focusing on long-term results, alleviate the pressures and incentives that induce fund
managers to consistently report superior returns in the short run. Consequently, fund
managers become less reluctant to produce quarterly reports that demonstrate that hold-
ings of stocks have experienced sharp performance declines in the short-term.
To specifically examine whether ESG funds managers have different disclosure be-
havior from their peers, I focus on portfolio window dressing, which is the fund man-
agers’ attempt to distort their portfolios by altering their holdings close to the end of
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the quarter, therefore misleading their fund investors. I use Agarwal et al. (2014)’s rank
gap measure of window dressing, which captures the spread between the rank of the
fund’s actual performance and the composite ranks of winner/loser holdings. Agarwal
et al. (2014) argue that portfolio window dressing has the potential to adversely affect
fund value through unnecessary portfolio churning. Consistent with the proposition that
ESG fund managers are less concerned that a poor quarter could lead to an outflow of
investors, I find that they engage in less portfolio window dressing than conventional
fund managers.
Motivated by the differences in disclosure behavior, I perform additional analyses
to better understand what underlying factors and mechanisms drive my results. To test
whether investor behavior is one of the forces driving managers’ disclosure behavior,
I examine investors’ sensitivity to information on portfolio holdings. On average, in-
vestors of ESG funds are slightly less sensitive to the presence of loser stocks in the
portfolio. These results corroborate the investors’ clientele hypothesis – that is, ESG
funds attract a distinct set of investors with longer investment horizons than those who
invest in conventional mutual funds.
While prior studies support the hypothesis that investors of ESG funds and conven-
tional funds differ in their inter-temporal preferences (Bollen, 2007, Renneboog et al.,
2011), the assumption that capital market intermediaries (i.e., mutual funds) should be
treated as a “veil” reflecting the preferences of investors is overly simplistic (He and Kr-
ishnamurthy, 2013). I then turn to investigate whether ESG fund managers’ investment
horizon differ from that of conventional managers. For this purpose, I use two prox-
ies for fund trading frequency – turnover rate and holding duration. Studies show that,
on average, funds that trade more frequently underperform (Chakrabarty et al., 2017,
Champagne et al., 2018, Cremers and Pareek, 2016). Even though excessive trading
4
could harm fund performance, managers have incentives to adopt a short-term perspec-
tive. This occurs because chasing long-term mispricing could be more expensive and
lead investors to misattribute inferior short-term stock returns to the manager’s low abil-
ity (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990, 1997). Concern over the manager’s trading ability could
generate an outflow of investors and, consequently, increase the risk that the manager is
terminated. I find that ESG fund managers indeed have longer investment horizons and
trade less.
Given the well-documented differences in investors’ clientele of ESG funds and tra-
ditional funds, a corporate governance mechanism that could plausibly explain the dif-
ferences in window-dressing and trading frequency could be simply the endogenous
choice of fund managers by investment management firms. In other words, investment
management firms could screen fund managers based on different dimensions of their
education and cultural background, placing more (or less) emphasis on some character-
istics contingent on whether the job applicant would manage an ESG or conventional
fund. To explore this possibility, I examine several characteristics, such as education,
dominant style, professional busyness, gender, and tenure. I find only two distinct char-
acteristics between ESG fund managers and conventional fund managers: ESG fund
managers, on average, have more experience managing active funds than passive funds;
and, on average, hold an additional position inside the investment management company
(e.g., analyst, trader, broker liaison). Overall, these findings further support the interpre-
tation that the difference in disclosure behavior of ESG fund managers is a manifestation
of differences in investors’ pressure and focus on short-term performance.
Taken together, my contributions speak to different strands of literature. First, my
empirical results further our understanding of ESG investing. Whereas prior research
focuses on the profitability of ESG funds, our understanding of the behavior of ESG in-
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stitutional money managers is relatively limited. To the best of my knowledge, this study
is the first to examine the relationship between the myopic behavior of fund managers
and ESG investing.
I present several pieces of evidence consistent with the hypothesis that investors
of ESG funds, through their long-term orientation, lessen capital market pressures that
induce fund managers to constantly report superior short-term investment decisions. In
addition, this paper also contributes to the literature analyzing the impact of managers’
skills on their decisions. My study fails to find any evidence that differences in skill
sets are the drivers of ESG fund managers’ less myopic behavior. My results emphasize
the role of additional incentives, besides financial compensation, on managers’ myopic
decisions.
Finally, this paper complements the extensive literature on mutual funds by identify-
ing how a fund-specific characteristic (ESG) that pertains to a broad class of investment
strategies and style relates to the investment behavior of fund managers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the related
literature and the empirical predictions. Section 3 provides the data description and
summary statistics, while Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 presents
additional analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
1.1.1 Related Literature and Empirical Predictions
Following the increasing relevance of ESG and corporate social responsibility (CSR),
there is a growing body of literature in accounting and finance on the real and reporting
effects associated with CSR activities. For example, studies provide empirical evidence
6
that firms with high CSR activities have less opaque financial reports and are less likely
to manage earnings (Dhaliwal et al., 2011, Kim et al., 2012). Moreover, CSR activities
of firms are also related to less informed trading (Gao et al., 2014), and firms with high
scores on material ESG issues tend to outperform those with low scores (Khan et al.,
2016).
From the standpoint of institutional investors, various empirical studies emphasize
the relationship between different investors’ decisions and the ESG performance of their
investee firms. For instance, when a mutual fund actively engages with an investee
firm to address ESG concerns, the latter generates positive abnormal returns over the
year following the engagement (Dimson et al., 2015). Recent studies show that after
recognizing the financial value of ESG, institutional investors persuade investee firms to
improve their ESG performance (Dyck et al., 2018) and that institutional investors with
longer horizons tend to prefer higher ESG firms (Starks et al., 2017).
1.1.2 ESG funds versus conventional funds
Previous studies indicate that ESG investors differ from ordinary investors in many di-
mensions. For example, Bollen (2007) analyzes investor cash flows of mutual funds
and finds that socially responsible mutual funds have lower volatility in their monthly
fund flows. In addition, he establishes that capital flows to socially responsible funds
are more sensitive to past positive returns and weakly less sensitive to negative past re-
turns. Using an international setting, Renneboog et al. (2011) corroborate the findings
of Bollen (2007) and document that the investors’ flows of socially responsible funds
are less sensitive to the average return of the previous 12 months. More recently, a study
by Riedl and Smeets (2017) combining individual-level data from a Dutch mutual fund
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provider with a survey and an experiment examines why investors hold socially respon-
sible mutual funds. They conclude that intrinsic social preference and social signaling
are major determinants of holding ESG equity funds. They also find financial motiva-
tions for investors’ decisions, since they are less likely to invest in ESG funds if they
expect these funds to underperform relative to conventional funds – albeit investors with
strong social motivations are willing to forgo financial returns to align their investments
with their social preferences.
However, it is not clear whether the behavior of fund investors is a sufficiently strong
incentive for managers to pursue long-term investment strategies desired by their in-
vestors’ clientele. First, seminal theories argue that managers’ behavior might be in-
fluenced by career concerns (Fama, 1980, Holmstro¨m, 1999, Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
Moreover, another body of literature documents different agency conflicts between fund
managers and their investors. They emphasize that managers’ investment decisions can
be affected both by the explicit compensation schemes and by implicit incentives result-
ing from their aspiration to attract new investors (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997, 1999a,b,
Khorana, 1996, Modigliani and Pogue, 1975). For instance, Brown et al. (1996) claim
that the competitive nature of the mutual fund environment alone can affect managers’
portfolio decisions. According to the authors, the mutual fund industry resembles a
tournament in which managers compete for new investors. Their evidence highlights
this behavior, as they establish that managers who are likely to end up as losers (win-
ners) shift their investments so as to increase (decrease) the risk levels of their portfolios.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) examine how the fear of getting fired can affect mutual
fund managers’ behavior. Their findings indicate that managers are punished for widely
deviating from the unsystematic risk level in their corresponding objective group. Con-
sequently, young managers, who have higher career concerns than senior managers, end
up taking less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios in order to avoid
8
getting penalized.
1.1.3 Fund manager short-termism
The voluminous literature on corporate myopia suggests that the excessive focus on
short-term performance is positively associated with earnings management and less ef-
ficient real investment decisions (Bhojraj et al., 2009, Roychowdhury, 2006). In his
seminal work, Roychowdhury (2006) shows evidence of managers manipulating real
activities to avoid reporting losses. Bhojraj et al. (2009) find that firms are willing to
cut discretionary expenses and manage accruals in order to exceed analyst forecasts and
that firms that beat forecasts by managing earnings enjoy a short-term stock price benefit
that is typically reversed over a three-year period.
The short-termism of fund managers can be harmful to both fund investors and in-
vestee companies. Bushee (1998), for example, concludes that institutional ownership,
on average, works as an efficient corporate governance mechanism by mitigating the
adverse incentives for corporate managers to reduce their R&D investments. However,
his findings also indicate when considering the ownership by institutional investors with
high portfolio turnover, the overall effect is reversed – i.e., a large proportion of short-
termist institutional owners increases the likelihood of managers cutting R&D to reverse
earnings declines. Agarwal et al. (2017) discover evidence of the direct effect of fund
manager short-termism on corporate short-termism. Exploiting the increase in the fre-
quency of mandatory disclosures of portfolio holdings by mutual fund managers, they
find that more frequent disclosures are associated with the increasing myopia of fund
managers, which leads to subsequent declines in the innovation activities of firms with
high fund ownership.
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A possible channel by which fund managers’ short-termism can harm their corre-
sponding investors is through portfolio window dressing, which is the strategy of adding
winners and/or eliminating losers to the portfolio in order to mislead investors regard-
ing their true ability (Agarwal et al., 2014, Lakonishok et al., 1991). To engage in
window dressing, managers have to buy (sell) stocks that have recently outperformed
(underperformed), hence, buying (selling) potentially overpriced (underpriced) securi-
ties. This unnecessary portfolio churning incurs high trading costs and is shown to be a
value-destroying activity, eventually worsening future fund performance (Agarwal et al.,
2014).
Motivated by prior literature, I posit that the long-term orientation of ESG investors
decreases capital market pressures that induce fund managers to regularly report supe-
rior short-term investment decisions, consequently decreasing their incentives to engage
in opportunistic disclosure behavior. This prediction can be formalized as the main
hypothesis of the paper, stated in a directional form:
Hypothesis: Managers of ESG mutual funds are less likely to engage in portfolio
window dressing than managers of conventional (non-ESG) mutual funds.
This hypothesis is not without tension. ESG mutual funds are subject to compen-
sation structures strictly based on financial performance akin to those of conventional
funds. That is, there are also reasons supported by the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture that would predict no differences in portfolio window dressing between ESG and
conventional funds.
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1.2 Data
A key empirical challenge when investigating differences between ESG and conven-
tional mutual funds is the fact that fund-specific actions (namely, investment philoso-
phies and trading strategies) are not directly observable. Whereas some mutual funds
are explicitly self-proclaimed as ESG funds, there is no specific market or regulatory
mechanism that prevents these funds from endogenously choosing to be ESG in name
only – i.e., to attract new investors. One way to assess whether funds follow ESG poli-
cies is through a sustainability rating assessed by a plausibly independent third party
provider. Since 2016, Morningstar gives mutual funds a rating based on how well the
holdings in their portfolio are managing ESG risks and opportunities relative to their
peers.
To calculate the ratings, Morningstar uses firm-level ESG scores provided by Sus-
tainalytics4, a research firm that provides ESG scores along with assessments of com-
panies’ involvement in ESG-related controversies for more than 4,500 firms globally, in
addition to tracking and categorizing ESG-related controversial incidents for more than
10,000 firms. The portfolio score is an asset-weighted average of the ESG scores of the
portfolio holdings, with deductions made for securities of firms involved in controver-
sial incidents. Then, based on their portfolio sustainability scores, funds are assigned
one of the following five descriptive ranks relative to their peers: High for the top 10%
of the funds; Above Average for the next 22.5%; Average for the next 35%; Bellow
Average for the next 22.5%; and Low for the bottom 10% of the funds. Morningstar
does not provide historical data on its sustainability ratings. To minimize this issue,
I collect information on the last four issued ratings and label funds “ESG” only when
they have a High ratings in each of the four periods. Thereby, I aim to capture funds
4Morningstar claims to use Sustainalytics due to its reputation for transparent, insightful research, and
great customer service.
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that have consistently high ESG ratings through time5. I merge the lists of ESG funds
to the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database. CRSP Mutual Fund pro-
vides various fund-specific characteristics along with portfolio holdings information. I
use CRSP Monthly Stock and Compustat to gather market and fundamental data on the
funds’ equity holdings. Funds that do not have the requisite information from all three
databases in any given quarter are dropped from the sample. I restrict the analysis to
actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds, excluding index, bond, and international
funds from my sample6. Since CRSP’s fund portfolio holdings data starts in 2001, I use
a quarterly sample from 2001 to 2017 for the analysis, comprising a total of 68 quarters.
Following early studies that claim that small mutual funds behave differently from other
funds (Bhojraj et al., 2012, Chen et al., 2004, Elton et al., 2001), I restrict the sample to
mutual funds with total net assets (TNA) exceeding $15 million. For funds with mul-
tiple share classes in CRSP, I compute the sum of TNA in each share class to arrive at
the TNA in the fund. The final sample is comprised of 4,696 unique conventional mu-
tual funds and 127 unique ESG mutual funds. To correct for the naturally unbalanced
properties of the samples of ESG and conventional funds, in all the empirical tests I use
entropy balancing with fund size, age, and strategy as parameters7. Table 1.1 provides
the summary statistics for the key variables used in the study. In panel B, I report the
means and standard deviations of the variables for ESG mutual funds and conventional
mutual funds. In panel C, I report time-series averages of the cross-sectional correlations
between various fund characteristics. Consistent with previous studies, LogFamilyS ize,
LogFundS ize, and Load are positively correlated with each other.
5I run the same tests presented in this paper using a continuous sustainability score and an indicator
variable that takes a value of one if the fund is in the highest decile of the average sustainability score and
obtain similar, although weaker, results.
6To do this, I select mutual funds whose CRSP Objective Code (crsp obj cd) is “ED,” “EDCM,”
“EDCS,” “EDSC,” “EDSI,” “EDSN,” “EDST,” “EDSU,” “EDYB,” “EDYG,” “EDYH,” or “EDYI.”
7Entropy balancing is a re-weighting technique that represents a generalization of propensity score
matching to achieve significantly improved covariate balance across treatment and control samples (Hain-
mueller, 2012).
12
Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients
Panel A: Sample Selection
# of ESG ESG Conventional
Funds Funds Funds
US Equity Funds (actively managed) 244 Number of unique funds 127 4,696
Missing CRSP items (74) Number of unique families 78 770
Funds with TNA < $15 million (43) Average funds per quarter 39 1,331
Total 127
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
ESG Funds
Fund size ($ million) 856.06 1,135.51 15.60 4,617.60
Log fund size 6.21 1.80 2.83 8.97
Family size ($ million) 137,650.40 282,766.70 25.50 1,500,285.00
Log family size 9.78 2.52 3.24 14.22
Turnover 0.48 0.38 0.05 2.83
Holding duration (years) 1.88 0.93 0.17 3.89
Manager tenure (years) 8.32 5.21 0.42 20.25
Fund age 16.86 14.34 1.33 80.67
Expense ratio 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.024
% Fund flows 0.01 0.11 -0.32 0.91
Market-adj returns 0.004 0.028 -0.106 0.082
Beta-adj returns -2.97 0.64 -6.40 -1.29
3 factor-adj returns -3.23 1.52 -7.51 2.08
4 factor-adj returns -2.97 1.68 -7.58 2.33
Conventional Funds
Fund size ($ million) 614.25 1415.06 15.70 9124.50
Log fund size 5.06 1.58 2.75 9.12
Family size ($ million) 161,417.20 337,064.40 25.50 1,874,617.00
Log family size 10.06 2.54 3.24 14.44
Turnover 0.83 0.78 0.03 4.82
Holding duration (years) 1.50 0.90 0.00 4.69
Manager tenure (years) 8.22 5.13 0.42 24.58
Fund age 14.94 13.55 0.50 93.42
Expense ratio 0.012 0.004 0.001 0.025
% Fund flows 0.01 0.17 -0.32 1.04
Market-adj returns -0.002 0.036 -0.338 0.412
Beta-adj returns -3.05 0.95 -12.32 3.88
3 factor-adj returns -3.44 1.98 -26.48 6.73
4 factor-adj returns -3.32 2.21 -24.65 20.43
Panel C: Time-series averages of correlations between fund characteristics
Log Log Expense
Turnover Fund size fund size Fund flows family size ratio Fund age Load
ESG Funds
Turnover 1
Fund size -0.20 1
Log fund size -0.13 0.73 1
Fund flows -0.04 -0.18 -0.15 1
Log family size 0.14 0.30 0.63 -0.11 1
Expense ratio 0.17 -0.38 -0.42 0.09 -0.17 1
Fund age 0.00 0.54 0.49 -0.24 0.32 -0.34 1
Load -0.12 0.17 0.22 -0.18 0.26 -0.01 0.33 1
Conventional Funds
Turnover 1
Fund size -0.17 1
Log fund size -0.19 0.72 1
Fund flows 0.04 -0.24 -0.20 1
Log family size -0.06 0.27 0.37 -0.10 1
Expense ratio 0.18 -0.32 -0.42 0.07 -0.21 1
Fund age -0.11 0.40 0.46 -0.19 0.18 -0.26 1
Load -0.04 0.08 0.10 -0.07 0.15 0.05 0.32 1
This table presents descriptive statistics of the main variables used for estimating Equations (1.3) and (1.4). For variable
descriptions, see the appendix A.
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1.2.1 Measurement of Window Dressing
I follow Agarwal et al. (2014) to construct the window dressing measures. Their ratio-
nale is that, on average, poorly performing funds should have a greater percentage of
loser stocks and a smaller percentage of winner stocks in their portfolio when compared
to well-performing funds. Conversely, poorly performing funds with a high percentage
of winners and a low percentage of losers suggests a higher likelihood of window dress-
ing behavior. I use the Agarwal et al. (2014) measure of window dressing called Rank
Gap, which is a relative measure that captures the discrepancy between a performance-
based ranking of a fund and a ranking based on the proportions of winner and loser
stocks disclosed by the fund at quarter-end. The intuition is to capture situations where
the overall performance of the fund is inconsistent with the corresponding performance
of its portfolio holdings.
For each fiscal quarter t, I create quintiles of all domestic stocks in the CRSP stock
database by sorting stocks according to their returns over the past three months. The
first (fifth) quintile consists of stocks that achieve the highest (lowest) returns. Next,
using funds’ reported holdings, I calculate the proportion of each fund’s assets invested
in the first and fifth quintiles, referring to these two extreme quintiles as winner and
loser proportions, respectively. I then rank the funds between 1 and 100 in three ways:
(1) for the performance rank I sort funds in descending order by their quarterly returns;
(2) for the winner rank I sort funds in descending order according to their proportion of
winner stock holdings; (3) for the loser rank I sort funds in ascending order according to
their proportion of loser stock holdings. That way, a well-performing fund should have
high ranks (i.e., closer to the 1st percentile) and a poorly performing fund should have
low ranks (i.e., closer to the 100th percentile) in all three ranks. However, a fund with
a low-performance rank but relatively high rankings of winner and loser proportions
14
should have a greater likelihood of window dressing. The Rank Gap is computed as
follows:
RankGap =
Per f ormanceRank − WinnerRank + LoserRank
2
200
(1.1)
The measure is scaled by 200 to lie between –0.5 and 0.5. The higher the Rank
Gap is, the larger the discrepancy between the fund’s actual performance and the fund’s
disclosure of winners and losers stocks – therefore, the greater the likelihood of window
dressing. For the empirical analysis, I use Rank Gap in its continuous form and also as
an indicator variable based on the top 10% and 20% values of this Rank Gap continuous
measure. Figure 1.2 plots the histogram of the frequency distribution of the Rank Gap
score for conventional funds (Panel A) and ESG funds (Panel B).
1.3 Empirical Results
In order to empirically test my main hypothesis that ESG fund managers differ from
their conventional counterparts in their opportunistic disclosure behavior, I estimate the
following reduced-form specification:
WDi,t = αi + γt + β1ESG f undi +
∑
βiZi,t + i,t, (1.2)
where i indexes different mutual funds and t quarters. The variable WDi,t denotes the dif-
ferent proxies for window dressing – i.e., Rank Gap, as the continuous variable defined
in Section 3.1 and indicator variables based on the top 10% and 20% of the distribution
of Rank Gap estimated using probit specifications. αi denotes fund strategy fixed effects
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and γt time fixed effects. ESG f undi is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund
has high ESG ratings according to Morningstar. The vector Zi,t denotes a set of control
variables with previously documented effects on funds’ performance and disclosure be-
havior, such as load, fund flows, fund size, family size, expense ratio, fund age, and fund
return.8 In all empirical specifications throughout this paper, I cluster standard errors at
the fund level to account for correlation between repeated observations associated with
the same mutual fund (Petersen, 2009).
Table 1.2 depicts the OLS and probit estimates for all three measures of window
dressing. My main coefficient of interest is β1, whose estimates are all negative and
statistically significant (p-values<0.01). These results, while far from conclusive, are
consistent with previous studies that show that investors of ESG funds are less sensitive
to negative financial performance, therefore reducing managers’ incentives to engage in
opportunistic disclosure behavior. In other words, they have less incentive to mislead
investors when they have a poor quarter performance.
1.4 Additional Analysis
Motivated by the differences in disclosure behavior documented in Table 1.2, I perform
additional analyses to better understand what underlying factors and mechanisms are
driving my results.
8The variables are described in detail in Appendix A.
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Table 1.2 ESG Funds and Window Dressing
Rank Gap Rank Gap 10% Rank Gap 20%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ESG f undi -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.165*** -0.171*** -0.132*** -0.141***
(-4.13) (-4.19) (-2.80) (-2.79) (-2.91) (-3.06)
Loadi,t 0.007* 0.083 0.081
(1.96) (1.16) (1.50)
FundFlowsi,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.80) (-1.26) (-0.93)
FundS izei,t -0.001 -0.051** -0.019
(-1.13) (-2.34) (-1.04)
FamilyS izei,t 0.001 -0.005 -0.008
(1.08) (-0.50) (-0.89)
ExpenseRatioi,t 0.706 4.139 10.004
(1.08) (0.37) (1.26)
FundAgei,t -0.000 -0.007*** -0.005***
(-1.22) (-2.65) (-2.88)
FundReturni,t 0.002** 0.023* 0.014
(2.05) (1.66) (1.26)
Quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Strategy FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.06
N 46,806 46,806 46,806 46,806 46,806 46,806
This table presents ordinary least-squares estimates of Equation (1.2) in column (1) and (2) and probit estimates in columns
(3) to (6) relating window dressing to social responsibility. Rank Gap is a measure of window dressing developed by
Agarwal et al. (2014). Rank Gap 10%(20%) is an indicator variable defined as 1 if Rank Gap is in the top 10th (20th)
percentile for a given quarter, and zero otherwise . ESG funds is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund have high
ESG ratings. For other variable descriptions, see appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. Statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
1.4.1 Fund Flow
Theoretical and empirical studies indicate that investors of socially responsible funds
should be less sensitive to past negative results, not only because they are willing to pay
a premium to indirectly hold socially responsible investments but also due to their long-
term investment perspective (Bollen, 2007, Gollier and Pouget, 2014, Heinkel et al.,
2001, Renneboog et al., 2011). To empirically test whether the behavior of investors
is what drives managers’ willingness to engage in opportunistic behavior, I examine
investors’ flow sensitivity to the presence of loser and winner stocks in the funds’ port-
folio. I estimate the relationship between funds’ social responsibility classification and
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fund flows with the following specification:
Flowi,t+1 = αi + γt + β1%Losersi,t + β2%Winnersi,t
+
∑
βiZi,t + i,t
(1.3)
where Flow is the quarterly capital flows for a fund, measured as the percentage change
in a fund’s assets after adjusting for fund returns; αi denotes fund strategy fixed effects;
and γi time fixed effects. %Losersi,t (%Winnersi,t) is the percentage of assets of a fund
invested in stocks that had an inferior (superior) performance in quarter t. I follow
Lakonishok et al. (1991)’s and Agarwal et al. (2017)’s approach to build the %Losersi,t
(%Winnersi,t) variables. Losing (winning) stocks are those that fall in the bottom (top)
quintile of return performance within the group of firms with a similar size and book-to-
market ratios during the reporting period t. I first separate stocks into quintiles based on
size. Then, within each size quintile, I create book-to-market quintiles, resulting in 25
conditional portfolio sorts. Losing (winning) stocks are the ones in the bottom (top) 20%
based on return performance in each of the 25 groups. In addition, I use quintiles of the
%Losersi,t (%Winnersi,t) variables. High%Loseri,ts (High%Winnersi,t) is an indicator
variable that takes the value of one if the fund is in the highest quintile. To test the
fund flows sensitivity to fund performance, I utilize ReturnBottomi,t (ReturnTopi,t) that
equals one if the fund is on the bottom (top) quintile of returns. Similar to my main
results of portfolio window dressing, vector Zi,t denotes the set of control variables which
plausibly affect fund performance and, in turn, capital flows of fund investors.
Figure 1.3 plots the average capital flows of ESG funds and conventional funds. Ta-
ble 1.3 presents the coefficient estimates of Equation (1.3). Columns (1) and (4) report
the estimates using the continuous variables %Losersi,t (%Winnersi,t); columns (2) and
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Figure 1.3 Quarterly Fund Flows
2005 2008 2010 2013 2015
−20
0
20
40
Q
ua
rt
er
ly
fu
nd
flo
w
s
($
M
ill
io
n)
ESG funds
Conventional funds
This figure presents the average fund flows, defined as the percentage change in the assets under management of a fund
after adjusting for fund returns during the quarter.
(5) use the indicator variables High%Losersi,t (High%Winnersi,t); and columns (3) and
(6) report the indicator variables ReturnBottomi,t (ReturnTopi,t). First, by considering a
sample comprised of conventional funds only, we can conclude that the coefficients on
%Losersi,t and High%Losers are negative and statistically significant (p-value<0.01),
suggesting that investors of conventional funds respond negatively to the presence of
losing stocks in the fund portfolio. However, when restricting the sample to ESG funds
only, I find that the coefficients of %Losersi,t and High%Losers are not significant, fail-
ing to provide evidence that investors of ESG Funds are as sensitive to the presence of
losing stocks as their conventional peers. A similar pattern is observed regarding the co-
efficient estimates of %Winnersi,t and High%Winners. Investors of conventional funds
respond positively to the presence of winning stocks, whereas ESG funds’ investors
show no sensitivity. The aforementioned results corroborate previous studies that argue
that investors of ESG funds have long-term investment horizons, therefore they are less
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Table 1.3 Fund Flow Sensitivity to Winners and Losers
ESG f undi ConventionalFundi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
%Losersi,t -0.046 -0.533***
(-0.19) (-5.93)
%Winnersi,t 0.468* 0.295***
(1.85) (4.40)
High%Losersi,t -4.930 -10.688***
(-0.57) (-4.96)
High%Winnersi,t 6.887 7.252***
(0.65) (3.24)
ReturnBottomi,t -5.921 -8.905**
(-0.43) (-1.97)
ReturnTopi,t 13.995 0.422
(0.96) (0.12)
Loadi,t -20.916* -19.946* -20.408* -10.726*** -10.700*** -10.704***
(-1.93) (-1.84) (-1.94) (-2.84) (-2.83) (-2.82)
FundS izei,t -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.89) (-2.25) (-2.23) (-2.21)
FamilyS izei,t -2.563 -2.297 -2.514 0.117 0.108 0.035
(-1.13) (-1.03) (-1.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.06)
Fund age -1,118.002 -974.476 -922.836 375.917 366.378 361.998
(-0.70) (-0.62) (-0.61) (0.95) (0.93) (0.92)
ExpenseRatioi,t -0.692 -0.602 -0.580 -0.567*** -0.575*** -0.585***
(-1.16) (-1.03) (-1.00) (-3.63) (-3.68) (-3.76)
FundAgei,t -0.965 -0.264 0.023 -5.540*** -5.403** -5.278**
(-0.16) (-0.05) (0.00) (-2.65) (-2.57) (-2.49)
FundReturni,t 2.216 2.046 2.183 -1.121* -1.287** -1.419**
(1.52) (1.42) (1.52) (-1.87) (-2.13) (-2.35)
Quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Strategy FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.05
N 1,849 1,849 1,849 26,943 26,943 26,943
This table reports the results of regressions using quarterly percentage net fund flows during the lead quarter as the dependent
variable. FundFlowsi,t is the percentage change in the assets under management of a fund after adjusting for fund returns
during the quarter. %Losers (%Winners) is the percentage of assets of a mutual fund invested at the end of quarter t in losing
(winning) stocks as defined in section (5.1). For other variable descriptions, see appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at
the fund level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *,
**, and ***, respectively.
sensitive to investment holdings labeled as “winners” or “losers” purely based on past
financial performance.
1.4.2 Investment Horizon
As previously discussed, although studies show that investors of ESG funds have longer
investment horizons (Bollen, 2007, Renneboog et al., 2011), the assumption that cap-
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ital market intermediaries’ actions fully reflect the preferences of their client-investors
is overly simplistic (He and Krishnamurthy, 2013). Therefore, I turn to investigating
whether ESG fund managers’ investment horizons differ from those of conventional
managers. I use two measures of manager’s investment horizon, Fund Turnover and
Holding Duration. A fund turnover rate is the percentage of the fund’s holdings that
have been replaced in a given period, and holding duration is the average length of time
securities are normally held in the portfolio. The turnover rate inherently captures the
inverse of holding duration – i.e., the shorter the investment horizon, the higher the
turnover. I obtain the quarterly turnover measure from the CRSP Mutual Fund database,
which accounts for the minimum of the total purchases and sales by a fund in a quarter
divided by the beginning-of-the-quarter assets under management. For holding dura-
tion, I use Cremers and Pareek (2016) measure, which is the average of the duration of
ownership of each stock held by fund i in quarter t. The duration for each stock j is
computed as follows:
Durationi, j,t−1 =
t−1∑
τ=t−W
( (t − τ − 1)αi, j,τ
H j,t−1 + Bi, j,t−1
)
+
(W − 1)Hi, j,t−1
Hi, j,t−1 + Bi, j,t−1
, (1.4)
where Bi, j,t−1 is the total percentage of shares of stock j bought by fund i between τ =
t −W and t − 1. Hi, j,t−1 is the percentage of total shares outstanding of stock j held by
fund i at time t − 1. αi, j,t is the percentage of total shares outstanding of stock j bought
or sold by fund i between t − 1 and t, where αi, j,t > 0 for buys and αi, j,t < 0 for sells.
Following Cremers and Pareek (2016), I set W = 20 quarters.
To estimate the relationship between funds’ ESG engagement and their managers’
investment horizon, I use the following equation:
log(Horizon)i,t = αi + γt + β1ESG f undi +
∑
βiZi,t + i,t, (1.5)
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where the variable Horizoni,t denotes either the fund turnover measure provided by the
CRSP Mutual Fund database or duration, as defined in equation (1.4). The coefficient
of interest is β1 – i.e., the estimate of the association between a fund pursuing ESG
strategies and the longevity of its stock holding period. The vector Zi,t denotes the same
set of fund-level covariates that are known to affect investment horizon.
Table 1.4 reports the estimates of equation (1.5). The estimated coefficient for ESG
funds, β1, is statistically significant for both Turnover (negative) and Duration (posi-
tive), demonstrating that managers of ESG funds do indeed use long-term performance
metrics for their investment decisions.
Table 1.4 Fund Manager Investment Horizon
ln(Turnover)i,t ln(Duration)i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ESG f undi -0.433*** -0.361*** -0.365*** 0.239*** 0.184*** 0.193***
(-5.23) (-4.69) (-4.88) (3.28) (2.69) (3.06)
Loadi,t -0.074 -0.070 0.047 -0.007
(-0.87) (-0.84) (0.69) (-0.10)
FundFlowsi,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.34) (-0.57) (-0.96) (-1.11)
FundS izei,t -0.096*** -0.099*** 0.076*** 0.078***
(-3.14) (-3.51) (3.37) (3.68)
FamilyS izei,t 0.060*** 0.049*** -0.035** -0.033**
(3.03) (2.59) (-2.27) (-2.34)
ExpenseRatioi,t 20.785** 13.166 -16.953** -12.388*
(1.99) (1.48) (-2.21) (-1.69)
FundAgei,t 0.001 0.003 0.003* 0.003
(0.38) (1.25) (1.80) (1.60)
FundReturni,t -0.017 -0.031** 0.041*** 0.039**
(-1.22) (-2.22) (2.76) (2.53)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Strategy FE no no yes no no yes
R2 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.29
N 46,583 46,583 46,583 7,986 7,986 7,986
This table presents ordinary least-squares estimates of Equation (1.3) relating investment horizon to social responsibility. Ln(Turnover) is the
natural log of the turnover ratio as provided by the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, defined as the minimum of the total purchases and sales
by a fund in a quarter divided by the beginning-of-the-quarter assets. Ln(Duration) is a measure of investor duration developed by Cremers
and Pareek (2016). ESG funds is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund have high ESG ratings. For other variable descriptions, see
appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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1.4.3 Managers’ Characteristics
Taken together, my results highlighting differences in window dressing and fund flows
of ESG funds (vis-a`-vis conventional funds) are empirically consistent with the hypoth-
esis that managers of ESG funds translate the preferences of their ESG investors to
their portfolio and disclosure decisions. However, such results still leave questions to
be answered, such as the specific mechanisms through which investors’ preferences
are implemented. For example, one possible (governance) mechanism is that invest-
ment management companies, in knowing the objectives of their investors’ clientele,
simply screen fund managers based on different dimensions of their education and cul-
tural background, placing more (or less) emphasis on some characteristics contingent
on whether the job applicant would manage an ESG or conventional fund.
To investigate this possible channel, I examine several fund managers characteris-
tics by using information provided by IPREO’s BD Advanced, a proprietary database
that contains data of over 40,000 fund managers, analysts, and senior corporate man-
agers. I collect information about managers’ education, investment approach, tenure,
professional busyness, and gender. I then use fuzzy matching using managers’ names to
find correspondences between the sample extracted from CRSP and the sample obtained
from IPREO’s BD Advanced. The final sample is comprised of 479 unique mutual fund
managers, of which 19 manage at least one ESG fund. To correct for the naturally unbal-
anced properties of the samples of ESG fund managers and conventional fund managers,
in all the empirical tests I use entropy matching, with fund family size and fund age as
balancing parameters. I run manager-level regressions defined as follows:
ESGmanagerm,t = αm + β1Femalem + β2Gradm,t + β3ActiveInvestorm
+β4Tenurem,t + β5GrowthInvestorm + β6Busynessm + m,t +
∑
βiZi,t,
(1.6)
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where ESGmanagerm,t is an indicator variable that equals one if the professional man-
ages the portfolio of at least one ESG mutual fund and zero otherwise. Femalem is an
indicator variable that equals one if the mutual fund manager is female. Gradm,t is an in-
dicator variable that equals one if the fund managers have a graduate degree (e.g., MBA
or Ph.D.). ActiveInvestorm takes the value of one if most of the funds that the man-
ager m manages currently or in the past are actively managed. Tenurem,t is the number
of months scaled by 12 since the manager has been at the helm of the mutual fund.
GrowthInvestorm is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund manager’s dom-
inant investment style is “growth” or “aggressive growth.” Busynessm takes the value
of one if the fund manager holds one or more concurrent job positions inside the in-
vestment management company (e.g., analyst, trader, broker liaison). The vector Zm,t
denotes a set of fund characteristics variables average at fund manager level, such as the
average size of the funds, family size, the average expense ratio, the average age of the
funds, and the average return of the funds managed by manager m.
Table 1.5 presents the results of relating the ESG nature of the fund and the fund
manager specific characteristics. I run probit models to capture the probability of man-
agers being assigned to manage ESG funds conditional on their specific characteris-
tics, clustering standard errors at the manager level to allow for correlation between
repeated observations from the same individual. The estimated coefficient for active in-
vestor, ActiveInvestorm, is positive and statistically significant, showing that managers
of ESG funds are more likely to manage active funds. Since ESG fund managers have
more experience managing active funds than passive funds, we would expect that ESG
fund managers would trade more frequently in order to yield alpha to their investors,
which runs contrary to the results of this study. The coefficient for professional busy-
ness, Busynessm, is also positive and significant, indicating that ESG fund managers are
slightly more likely to have multiple functions inside the investment management firm.
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Table 1.5 Fund Managers Characteristics
Dependent variable: ESGmanagerm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Femalem -0.669 -0.476 -0.325
(-1.11) (-0.72) (-0.50)
Gradm -0.356 -0.464 -0.526*
(-1.08) (-1.50) (-1.76)
ActiveInvestorm 1.210*** 1.257*** 1.301***
(2.92) (3.02) (3.13)
Tenurem,t 0.016 -0.013 -0.008
(0.63) (-0.58) (-0.35)
GrowthInvestorm -0.284 -0.307 -0.309
(-0.93) (-1.00) (-1.09)
Busynessm 0.582* 0.587* 0.683**
(1.85) (1.85) (2.55)
FundReturni,t 0.038 0.046 0.050 0.043 0.040 0.043 0.050*
(1.15) (1.44) (1.52) (1.27) (1.15) (1.39) (1.73)
ExpenseRatioi,t -14.072 -17.350 -33.883 -20.036 -19.214 -9.466 -23.783
(-0.43) (-0.51) (-1.00) (-0.62) (-0.57) (-0.29) (-0.77)
FundAgei,t -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.001
(-0.12) (0.04) (-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.32) (0.02) (0.09)
FundS izei,t -0.016 -0.002 -0.016 -0.022 -0.011 0.015 0.012
(-0.14) (-0.02) (-0.15) (-0.22) (-0.10) (0.15) (0.12)
FamilyS izei,t 0.002 -0.011 -0.032 0.006 0.013 0.031 0.021
(0.04) (-0.19) (-0.49) (0.12) (0.23) (0.56) (0.39)
Quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.14
N 6,973 6,973 6,973 6,914 6,973 6,973 6,974 6,914
This table presents probit estimates of Equation (1.6) relating managing an ESG fund to fund manager characteristics.
ESGmanagerm,t is an indicator variable that equals one if the professional manages the portfolio of at least one ESG mutual
fund and zero otherwise. For other variable descriptions, see appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the manager level.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respec-
tively.
I fail to find evidence of any other statistically significant difference between fund man-
agers characteristics that could affect their assignment to ESG funds, such as investment
style and tenure.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the long-
term orientation of ESG fund investors changes the reporting incentives of ESG fund
managers, leading to less reporting short-termism, reflected by less window dressing.
By using the ESG ratings of mutual funds provided by a third party entity, I show
that ESG fund managers engage in less portfolio window dressing than conventional
fund managers. I conduct a battery of tests to bolster the hypothesis that the preferences
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of ESG fund investors for long-term investment objectives are translated to the actions
of ESG fund managers. Specifically, I demonstrate that ESG fund managers have a
longer investment horizon (less turnover and longer holding duration) than conventional
managers, and investor flows of ESG funds are less sensitive to the presence of winners
and losers stocks in the funds’ portfolios vis-a`-vis conventional fund flows. Attempting
to shed light on a potential governance-related mechanism that ESG fund managers are
screening to manage these vehicles for different characteristics than their counterparts, I
fail to find evidence that individual managers’ characteristics are systematically different
for the two groups.
Overall, this paper contributes to the fast-growing literature on ESG investments by
demonstrating that, in addition to potential differences in financial returns, such invest-
ment vehicles differ from their conventional counterparts in their opportunistic reporting
decisions, an effect previously undocumented.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
Name Description
A. Fund-level measures
ESG f undi Funds that have rating High on the last four issued Morningstar Sustainability Rating.
RankGapi,t Spread between the rank of the fund’s actual performance and the composite ranks of winner/loser holdings, computed as follows:
RankGap =
Per f ormanceRank − WinnerRank + LoserRank
2
200
Turnoveri,t Minimum of the total purchases and sales by a fund in a quarter divided by the beginning-of-the-quarter assets, as provided by
the CRSP Mutual Fund Database.
Durationi,t Fund duration is computed by averaging the duration of stock i in fund j in quarter t , using the market value of the stock holdings
in each fund?s portfolio as weights. The duration for each stock i in fund j is computed as:
Durationi, j,t−1 =
t−1∑
τ=t−W
( (t − τ − 1)αi, j,τ
H j,t−1 + Bi, j,t−1
)
+
(W − 1)Hi, j,t−1
Hi, j,t−1 + Bi, j,t−1
,
where Bi, j,t−1 is the total percentage of shares of stock j bought by fund i between τ = t−W and t−1. Hi, j,t−1 is the percentage of
total shares outstanding of stock j held by fund i at time t− 1. αi, j,t is the percentage of total shares outstanding of stock j bought
or sold by fund i between t − 1 and t, where αi, j,t > 0 for buys and αi, j,t < 0 for sells. Following Cremers and Pareek (2016), I set
W = 20 quarters.
%Losersi,t(%Winnersi,t) Percentage of assets of a mutual fund invested in losing (winning) stocks, that is, stocks that fall in the bottom (top) quintile
of return performance within the group of firms with similar size and book-to-market ratios during the reporting period t. We
first divide stocks into quintiles based on size, and then further each size quintile into five groups based on book-to-market ratio.
We then identify losing (winning) stocks as the bottom (top) 20% based on return performance in each size and book-to-market
group.
ReturnBottomi,t(ReturnTopi,t) Indicator variable that equals one if fund i is on the bottom (top) quintile of returns in quarter t.
FundS izei,t Total net assets (TNA) under management in millions of dollars.
Loadi,t Indicator variable defined as 1 if fund has any front-end or back-end load, and 0 otherwise.
ExpenseRatioi,t Fund’s annual expense ratio reported at fund?s fiscal year end, as provided by the CRSP Mutual Fund Database.
FundFlowsi,t Percentage change in the assets under management of a fund after adjusting for fund returns during the quarter.
FundAgei,t Number of months divided by 12 since the establishment of the fund.
FamilyS izei,t Sum of total net assets under management of the funds in the fund family that the fund belongs to.
FundReturni,t Fund return adjusted using the four-factor model in Carhart (1997).
B. Fund manager characteristics
ESGmanagerm Indicator variable that equals one if the professional manages the portfolio of at least one ESG mutual fund and zero otherwise.
Femalem Indicator variable that equals one if the given name of the mutual fund manager m is a female name. Fund managers with unisex
given names were manually checked to determine the gender.
Gradm Indicator variable that equals one if the mutual fund manager holds any kind of graduate degree, such as MBA, MPS, JD, or
Ph.D.
ActiveInvestorm Indicator variable that equals one if most of the funds that the manager m manages currently or in the past are actively managed,
as provided by IPREO’s BD Advanced Database.
Tenurem,t Number of months scaled by 12 since the manager has been at the helm of the mutual fund.
GrowthInvestorm Indicator variable that equals one if the fund manager dominant investment style is “growth” or “aggressive growth”, as provided
by IPREO’s BD Advanced Database.
Busynessm Indicator variable that equals one if the fund manager holds one or more concurrent job positions inside the investment manage-
ment company, as provided by IPREO’s BD Advanced Database.
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